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NOTES AND COMMENTS
rule in requiring domicile of the child as a prerequisite to jurisdiction,
the decision does no violence to the full faith and credit requirement.30
Even if Alabama followed the rule suggested above, not requiring the
domicile of the child if both parents are before the court, the result in the
Gafford case probably would have been the same. The facts indicated
sufficient change in condition to have warranted a new custody award.
Thus, in each of these cases the court consistently applies its rule
that presence of the child is necessary to jurisdiction for an award of
custody, and indicated the limits of the full faith and credit requirement
in such cases.
0. E. Ross, III.
Constitutional Law-Use of Stomach Pump-Denial of Due Process
"Evidence forcibly extracted from the stomach of a prisoner may not
be used validly to convict him of a crime, the Supreme Court ruled today.
Such procedure, it held, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The American public was thus informed by the press
of the decision in the case of Rochin v. People of California.2  Several
state law enforcement officers, without a search warrant, forced their
way into the room in which the defendant had been sleeping, acting on
information that defendant had narcotics in his possession. Upon their
entry defendant swallowed two capsules which had been laying on a
night stand. Following a struggle in which the officers were unable to
force him to expel the evidence they handcuffed the defendant, took him
to a hospital and after strapping him to an operating table, forced a
stomach pump down his throat and retrieved the capsules. On this
evidence defendant was convicted and sentenced, and the California
Supreme Court denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the conviction, however, without unanimity of
opinion as to the reasons for the reversal. The majority held that through
their actions the state officers had denied defendant due process of law.
Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in the reversal, felt that this was
too nebulous a standard, and that the specific point involved was that
the defendant had been forced to give testimony against himself, thus
denying him the protection of the Fifth Amendment.3
" See note 10 supra.
However, the court did not look to the Alabama cases to determine the juris-
diction of the Alabama court. Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N. C. 218, 222, - S. E. 2d
- (1952). This does not seem to conform with accepted principles of conflict of
laws. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§7, 8 (1934).
1 N. Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1952, §1, p. 1, col. 6.
"The Supreme Court struck out today at the forcible use of a stomach pump to
get narcotics evidence, denouncing such police methods as akin to the old-time rack
and screw." Raleigh (N. C.) News and Observer, Jan. 3, 1952, §1, p. 1, col. 6.
See Time, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 22, col. 1, story entitled, "Freedom of the Stomach."
2 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952).
Rochin v. People of California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 211 (1952).
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By common law rules evidence illegally obtained was admissible so
long as it was relevant and reliable, and defendant's only remedy was
against the officer for the illegal seizure.4 In 1914, Weeks v. United
States5 began a line of cases which has firmly established the federal rule
that illegally secured evidence will be excluded from trials in the federal
courts.6 However, the majority of state courts.continue to adhere to
the common law rule. 7 Three cases involving the use of stomach pumps
to procure evidence were reported prior to the Rochin case and each
followed a separate line of reasoning. In United States v. Williss the
stomach pump treatment was administered at the instance of federal
officers and the federal court held that this was such a violation of the
individual's person as to make it an unreasonable search and seizure.
In keeping with the federal exclusion rule, this automatically made the
evidence inadmissible. In another federal court case, the use of a stom-
ach pump by law enforcement officers was sternly condemned: "If the
stomach pump can be justified, then the opening of one's person by the
the surgeon's knife can be justified."0  Three years prior to the Willis
case the California court decided the case of People v. One 1941 Mer-
cury Sedan,10 again involving the use of a stomach pump in bringing to
'8 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE, §2183 (3d ed. 1940).
232 U. S. 383 (1914). The common law rule was followed in both the state
and federal courts for nearly one hundred years, until the case of Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885) held that compulsory production of books and papers
is unreasonable search and seizure, and that such evidence will be excluded. There
was a brief relapse to the common law rule in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 586
(1904), but the Supreme Court revived the Boyd rule in Weeks v. United States.
A limitation on the rule was therein made, to the effect that the illegal evidence
question must be raised by motion before the trial, but even this was relaxed in
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925), where it was held that if the de-
fendant had no reason to know that there had been a seizure, a motion before the
trial was not necessary. Since 1914 the "federal exclusion rule" has been con-
sistently adhered to in the federal courts, but its limits have been strictly drawn to
include only evidence secured by federal officers. For detailed history and criticism
of the rule see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §2184 (3d ed. 1940).
'Note, 35 GEo. L. J. 92 (1946).
'E.g., State v. Frye, 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P. 2d 793 (1942) ; People v. Gonzales,
20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P. 2d 44 (1942) ; People v. Richter's Jewelers Inc., 291 N. Y.
161, 51 N. E. 2d 690 (1943) ; State v. Vanhoy, 230 N. C. 162, 52 S. E. 2d 278
(1950). But see, N. C. GEo. STAT. §15-27 (Supp. 1951). For a complete line-up
of authority, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §2183 (3d ed. 1940) and notes thereto.
885 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. Cal. 1949).
'In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N. D. Tex. 1949). However, in this case
the stomach of the accused had been pumped by state officers and federal officers
were given the evidence. Although saying that this was an unreasonable search
and seizure and strongly condemning such practices, the court strictly construed the
federal exclusion rule and admitted the evidence since it was gathered by state
officers with no federal participation. This holding is in accord with Thompson v.
United States, 22 F. 2d 134 (4th Cir. 1927) ; and Lotto v. United States, 157 F. 2d
623, 625 (8th Cir. 1946) where the court said, "The United States may avail itself
of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely on their own
account."
10 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168 P. 2d 443 (1946). In People of California v. Rochin,
101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143, 225 P. 2d 1, 3 (1950) the court affirmed the conviction
but lashed out at the officers who had invaded the defendant's privacy and illegally
[Vol. 30
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light evidence of illegally possessed narcotics. Conforming to the ma-
jority state rule the court held that the evidence was physical, relevant,
and would be admitted without inquiry into the legality of its acquisi-
tion. In so holding the court cited with approval Ash v. State of Texas l
where still another rationale was used to admit the evidence. In this
case defendant swallowed two diamond rings in the presence of officers
who, after locating them with a fluoroscope, forcibly administered an
enema and retrieved the rings which were used in evidence to sustain a
conviction for possession of stolen property. It was held that inasmuch
as defendant had swallowed the stolen property in the presence of the
officers, they had a right to search him without warrant. The court said
that the method used was the only reasonable means of retrieving the
property, and therefore the search and seizure was valid.
From a comparison of these cases involving the use of a stomach
pump, all decided prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in
the Rochin case, the line is still dearly drawn between the state and
federal views as to the admissibility of the evidence.12 The grounds on
which the cases were decided, however, are significant. In federal court
the evidence was eliminated on the ground of unreasonable search and
seizure, and in the states which admitted it, this was the only point
discussed. Contrary to the original concept of unreasonable search1 3 it
is now settled that forcibly taking evidence from the body of the accused
violates his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 14
Perhaps the majority in the Rochin case ignored the search and
seizure angle because of a reluctance to extend the federal exclusion to
the state courts, thereby overruling previous decisions. 15 In 1949 the
Court said that the privilege against unreasonable search and seizure
applied to protect citizens from state action, but it added that this pro-
tection did not force the states to apply the rule of exclusion.16 This rule
procured the convicting evidence. Although stating the record revealed "a shocking
series of violations of constitutional rights" the court nevertheless followed the
common law rule and admitted the evidence.
" 138 Tex. Cr. R. 420, 141 S. W. 2d 341 (1940).
A detailed analysis of the admissibility rule in the state and federal courts is
not within the scope of this note. However, for excellent discussion on the con-
flicting views compare Harno, Evidence Obtainel, by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19
IL. L. REv. 303 (1925) and Nrote, 35 MINN. L. REv. 457 (1951), with Comment, 45
MicH. L. Rzv. 605 (1947) and Note, 25 TULANE L. RFv. 410 (1951).
" For historical background of the application of the Fourth Amendment, see
Harno, supra note 12 at 303-307; Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity
Against Searches and Seizures, 34 W. VA. L. Q. 137 (1928).
'United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. Cal. 1949). The Fourth
Amendment "shows the sacredness of the person. The well-informed practitioner
of the law knows that one's home is one's castle. ... It is rather difficult to rea-
son one into the conclusion that the sacred person may be so violated, over the pro-
test of that person.. ." In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N. D. Tex. 1949).
11 See, Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil
Liberties, 45 ILi.. L. R~v. 1 (1950).
1" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
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is not a constitutional guaranty, but a mere rule of evidence which the
Court was unwilling to extend to the states.17 If it had been decided
that Rochin's rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated
the decision would have given a more predictable standard to law en-
forcement officers, but the Court was apparently unwilling to reverse its
position.' 8
Another alternative ground was that argued for in the concurring
opinions by Justices Black and Douglas. 19 This was, that in forcing the
incriminating evidence from defendant's stomach the officers had forced
him to testify against himself in violation of his rights under the Fifth
Amendment. This is the view of a minority of state courts in the closely
analogous situation of blood tests (for determination of intoxication)
taken against the will of the accused. 20 However, it has been decided
by the United States Supreme Court that the privilege against self-
incrimination extends only to the situation where the evidence forced
from the accused is oral or testimonial.2 1 This line of reasoning has
been adhered to in the majority of state courts and in the lower federal
courts.22 Also, in order to base its opinion in the Rochin case on viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court would have
had to clear the hurdle of its previous holding that the Fifth Amendment
is not made effective by the Fourteenth as to state action.23
With these two alternatives24 unacceptable, the majority in the Rochin
case, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, settled the issue on the
broad but vague principles of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The necessity of protecting the innocent from violations
" For criticism of holding in Wolf case see Note, 35 CoRN. L. Q. 625 (1950).8 Note, 18 GEO. WAsH. L. Rxv. 262 (1950).
" Rochin v. People of California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 211 (1952).
"°E.g., People v. Dennis, 131 Misc. 62, 226 N. Y. Supp. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1928);
Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1940).
21 Holmes, J., in Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252 (1910): . . . the
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communica-
tions from him. .. ." (Italics added.) See Note, 22 So. CAL. L. REV. 483 (1949).
"2 State of Oregon v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945). See Comment,
1 VAND. L. REv. 243 (1948).
It would seem to be an unrealistic and strained interpretation to bring the
stomach pumping situation within the "testimonial" classification for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment. However, it appears that the concurring justices would
be willing to overrule the Holt case and hold that evidence forcibly taken from the
accused does not have to be oral or testimonial in order to violate his rights against
self-incrimination.
2" Adamson v. People of California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) : "It is settled law that
the clause of the Fifth Amendment, protecting a person against being compelled to
be a witness against himself, is not made effective by the Fourteenth Amendment
as a protection against state action.. . ." From this 5 to 4 decision Justices Douglas
and Black of the present Court dissented. See Comment, 33 IowA L. Ray. 666
(1948) and Note, 1 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1947). With the present substantially
decreased "liberal" minority, it is believed that the position of the dissent has little
chance of becoming the majority rule.
" There is another alternative ground on which the decision might have been
based, viz., by calling this a coerced confession.
[Vol. 30290-
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of their persons by law enforcement officers had to be weighed against
the inevitable result of allowing a guilty man to escape 2 5 The split in
authority on the admissibility of such evidence is a recognition of this
long-standing judicial 'dilemma. -2 6 The Court decided in favor of pro-
tecting the individual in a case wherein the officers went far beyond the
justifiable bounds of law enforcement activity. Speaking neither of un-
reasonable search, nor of self-incrimination, the majority declared that
the tactics here used were not to be tolerated as they were "methods too
close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."2 7
The state, through its officers, denied the defendant a fair trial, and the
Court stepped in to prevent his punishment under such circumstances. 28
Here the Court has taken a set of facts, and without applying to them
any preconceived -definitive test, nevertheless concludes that the conduct
violated the Constitution.29 The precedents in this field are limited, in
that particular fact situations are decisive in determining what the phrase
"due process of law" entails. It was early recognized that due process
was incapable of exact definition. 30 The phrase has acquired meaning
only through the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Out of
this process has come one relatively uniform concept: there are some
rights which are so fundamental to liberty and justice that a violation of
them involves denial of -due process.3 1 Since this nebulous criterion is
the only limitation upon judicial determination, the Court has consistently
felt it necessary to deny that it is resorting to "natural law."13 2 Although
the standards of due process lack precision and their application depends
upon the Court's view of the facts, the judges are called upon to abide
by the "community's sense of fair play and decency." 33
" See Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Search and Seizure, 25 COL L. REv. 11 (1925) at p. 25 -et seq.
2 Note, 35 GEo. L. J. 92 (1946).
.Rochin v. People of California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 210 (1952).
8 Hughes, J., in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 285 (1936): "The state
is free to regulate the procedure of its courts . .. unless in so doing it 'offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.'"
28 Lisenba v. People of California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941) : "The aim of the
requirement of due process is . . . to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use
of evidence whether true or false .... As applied to a criminal trial, denial ofdue process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice. ..."
20 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877).
For comprehensive listing of these fundamental rights, see Comment, 21 So.
CAL. L. REv. 47 (1947) at 57 and notes thereto.
"2 People v. Rochin, 72 Supp. Ct. 205, 209 (1952) ; Comment, supra note 31 at
59-60.
22 People v. Rochin, supra note 32 at 210. In determining what facts offend
this sense of fair play, the judges are not left to wander on their own, or draw
upon their own feelings and beliefs. They must instead look to the history of prior
decisions and to the wisdom of the judges who have gone before. These are the
things that form limitations on the Court and keep decisions in the due process
field from varying with the whims and idiosyncrasies of the individual judges. See
Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 (1947) (Mr. Justice
1952]
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Within this line of reasoning and into this pattern of decisions the
Court has placed the Rochin case. Although lacking the predictability
which the minority would like to give to the law of search and seizure, 84
the majority decision would seem to be preferred to one pin-pointed to a
specific constitutional guaranty.8 5 Its flexibility leaves the way open for
the advance of medical science in the field of more accurate crime de-
tection.36 It appears that a more satisfactory result will be reached since
each revolutionary detective device is likely to be tested constitutionally
as it is used in securing evidence. Due process, as thus defined, sets an
outside limit within which officers may work, but at the same time does
not fetter them with power so closely defined as to make it incapable of
beneficial use.
Contrary to the impression left by the press in reporting this deci-
sion,37 stomach pumping is not declared to be an unreasonable search
and seizure in state courts, nor must such evidence illegally obtained be
excluded from state trials. The decision holds only that on the combined
facts of this case, viz., the illegal entry into the defendant's room, the
assault and battery there, and the further assault, battery, and torture
at the hospital, the accused had been denied due process of law as guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is believed that out of this
and future decisions in similar situations, each of which will be decided
on its individual facts, will come a flexible and practicable body of law
on the admission of evidence gathered by modern medical devices.
JAMES D. BLOUNT, JR.
Contracts-Statute of Frauds-Recovery of Payments by Vendee
Contrary to most jurisdictions, the North Carolina Supreme Court
has consistently carried out the original purpose of the statute of frauds
relating to land by refusing to give effect to land contracts which are not
in writing or which are not signed by the party charged therewith.1 This
is clearly illustrated by the fact that it is one of only four courts in the
United States which does not recognize the part performance exception
Frankfurter concurring). "We ultimately rely, not upon courts of law, but upon
the convictions, the habits, and the actions of the community." Curtis, Due, and
Democratic, Process of Law, 1944 Wisc. L. REv. 39 at 52.
"' To base this decision on the Fifth Amendment would result in "an unequivo-
cal, definite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal courts." People v.
Rochin, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 213 (1952).
Note, 13 D rIoiT L. REv. 220 (1950).
See, Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to De-
termine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191 (1939) ; Note, 36 J. Cailm. L. 132 (1945);
Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 302 (1952).
" See note 1 supra.
1 "All contracts to sell or convey any lands ... shall be void unless said con-
tract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or by some person by him thereto lawfully author-
ized." N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-2 (1943).
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